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Non technical summary
This paper analyses the relationship between education and earnings for men
and women in France and Germany. It first adds to the existing literature through
the comparison of France and Germany. The observation of the patterns prevailing
both within and across countries enabled to gain new insights on the relationship
between education and individual labour market success. A further contribution of
this paper is a methodological innovation that makes it possible to assess the impact
of educational attainment not only on the expected level of earnings but also on the
earnings risk, measured here by the unexplained earnings variance. Moreover, the
impact of education on the selective and gender-specific access to employment has
been considered too.
The results indicate that the completion of a minimum level of general instruc-
tion yields an earnings premium that cannot be compensated by the completion a
vocational degree. Moreover, basic vocational education leads to a higher earnings
premium in Germany than in France. This points to the better efficiency of the
German system of vocational education compared to the low-status vocational edu-
cation in France, which remains rather theoretical, less connected to the job market,
and signals failure in general education. The completion of higher education yields
a particularly high earnings premium in both countries, but particularly in France,
though study duration is typically shorter. This is most probably the effect of the
presence of elite institutions in France. Furthermore, in both countries but espe-
cially in Germany, women have a lower educational attainment than men but enjoy
a higher earnings premium for education, anything else equal. The gender gap in
the earnings premium for education is much larger in Germany than in France.
Moreover, education affects the uncertainty of earnings. In both countries, gen-
eral qualifications are found to increase the earnings risk, whereas vocational one
to reduce it. More education, especially tertiary education, yields a high earnings
premium but is associated with the highest earnings uncertainty in both counties.
Looking at the effect of gender reveals further common patterns. Women have over-
all lower earnings and a higher earnings dispersion. However, they enjoy a higher
earnings premium for education than men on average, and though they face overall
a higher earnings uncertainty, they can to a larger extent than men reduce this risk
by investing in their education.
The findings show that only examining the effect of education in terms of earnings
level illustrates only one aspect of the relationship between education and earnings.
The level of education attained is not neutral with respect to earnings dispersion,
even after controlling for gender-specific selection into employment and a large num-
ber of explanatory factors.
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1 Introduction
France and Germany have chosen rather different options for their education sys-
tems, in particular concerning the degree to which labour market aspects are taken
into consideration. As an example, the German system of vocational education, with
the apprenticeship, is more closely linked to needs of the labour market than the
French one, in which general education has a higher priority. Conversely, at the
higher education level, the French system is more oriented towards practice than
the German one, with the presence of the Grandes Ecoles and a variety of practi-
cally oriented short tracks. In previous work (Lauer, 2003a), it was found that this
different prioritization at different levels of the education system had implications
in terms of unemployment risk, proved more or less efficient in terms of access to
and securing of employment. In this paper, I examine whether similar effects are
observable when considering not only access to employment but also the quality
of the employment acceeded, taking labour earnings as an indicator. The patterns
observed within and between countries are expected to provide information on the
efficiency of the respective education systems as providers of qualifications to be
used on the labour market.
The link between education and earnings has been the object of numerous em-
pirical studies in the past few decades, following the development of the human
capital theory pioneered by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) and the spread of data
sets available for research. Nevertheless, separate studies for either France or Ger-
many are hardly comparable due to different methodologies or fields of observation
and a look at the empirical evidence available so far reveals that there is no really
comparative research on this subject for France and Germany. Among the excep-
tions, Kaukewitsch and Rouault (1998) realised a comparison of wage hierarchies in
France and West Germany for 1995. However, the analysis is based on occupation
levels rather than education levels. Another comparison of France and Germany is
that of Brauns, Mu¨ller and Steinmann (1997), but in that case, the analysis does
not deal with earnings but with social class position. Besides, even though the lit-
erature on education and level of earnings is large (see for instance the overview of
the literature in Europe by Asplund and Pereira (1999), there is much less empirical
evidence on the impact of education on earnings dispersion. The only study covering
both France and Germany in that respect is that by Pereira and Martins (2000),
who ran parallel quantile regressions of very parsimonious earnings equations for a
wide range of European countries. Because education is solely measured as years
of schooling, the interpretation of the results is of limited interest for French and
German education policy, though. This paper aims to fill in this gap in research.
To be more specific, the aim of this paper is to examine the earnings prospects
that can be expected from the completion of various types and levels of qualification
produced by the French and German education systems, not only in terms of level
of earnings but also in terms of earnings dispersion. If education is viewed, following
human capital theory, as an investment that yields on average a positive return,
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then, the riskiness of that investment should also be considered. In this study, the
residual earnings dispersion, i.e. the variance in earnings that is not explained by the
observables, will be considered as a measure of the remaining earnings uncertainty
or briefly speaking, as a measure of earnings risk. Thus, in addition to the average
earnings premium to be expected from the investment in education, the paper aims
to determine its impact on the earnings risk. A specific modelling design has been
developed for this purpose. Basically, the econometric model proposed here is an ex-
tension of the Mincerian earnings equation derived from the human capital theory
(Mincer, 1974) to both account for sample selection and model the impact of educa-
tion on earnings uncertainty. Hereby, a particular focus is laid on the examination
of gender differences as well as on the distinction between general and vocational
education.
The chapter is structured as follows. After presenting some stylised facts on the
relationship between education and earnings (section 2), section 3 presents the mod-
elling framework used for the econometric analysis. Then, the data used as well as
the way the variables have been constructed are explained in section 4. Finally, the
results of the estimations are presented. The presence, the determinants and the
impact of the selectivity on the estimated impact of education on earnings level and
dispersion are described in section 5, whereas the estimated impact of educational
attainment in terms of average earnings premium and residual earnings dispersion
are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 summarises the key findings and draws
some conclusions.
2 Education and earnings: descriptive evidence
Let us first examine the distribution of earnings in both countries. Figure 1 depicts
the mean (primary axis) and the variance (secondary axis) of log hourly earnings
in France and Germany in 20001, overall as well as separately for men and women,
based on data from the Emploi survey for France and from the GSOEP for Germany.
The German sample is restricted to West German residents and for both countries,
the analyses focus on nationals or individuals born in the country and aged between
25 and 55. Moreover, I focus on regular employment and therefore exclude the
minimally employed (below 15 work hours a week) as well as those individuals who
report working more than 60 hours a week as a regular working time since the latter
does not seem not very plausible.
1 For both countries, the gross hourly earnings measure is computed from the gross monthly
earnings perceived in the month preceding the interview, expressed in Euros, divided by the
number of hours worked in that month. In the Emploi survey, gross monthly earnings are
given without the social security contributions paid by the employee, unlike in the GSOEP
data. In order to make figures comparable, the French earnings data were augmented by 20
percent, which corresponds to the level of social security contributions (see Kaukewitsch and
Rouault, 1998).Irregular payments from the previous year like a 13th month pay or a bonus
have been added to the gross earnings proportionally. Following Mincer (1974), the logarithm of
this measure of earnings is taken as outcome of interest for the subsequent econometric study.
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Figure 1: Gross hourly earnings by gender (2000)
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As appears from figure 1, the average earnings are higher in Germany than in
France. Men perceive higher earnings than women in both countries, but the gender
gap is significantly larger in Germany than in France. Moreover, the overall variance
of earnings is higher in Germany than in France. The earnings variance proves higher
for women than for men in both countries, but particularly in Germany. As a result,
the earnings variance is rather similar for French and German men (it is even slightly
higher for French men), but it is much higher for German women than for French
women.
Let us now have a look at the distribution of earnings by education level. The level
of educational attainment is defined by a combination of the highest degrees obtained
in general and in vocational education according to the typology reported in table
1. Figure 2 shows that the average earnings are higher in Germany than in France
at all education levels. The only exception are individuals with level 10 education,
i.e. without any degree, for which the earnings are slightly higher in France, though
minimally2. This might be an effect of the French minimum wage. In both countries,
individuals with no degree at all (level 10) have the lowest earnings, individuals with
a tertiary level degree the highest earnings. Between these extremes, however, the
progression of average earnings is not monotonous. The discriminating power of
education is stronger in Germany than in France.
Another feature that emerges from figure 2 is that the variance of earnings is
higher at low qualification levels but also at university levels, while it is lowest for
basic and advanced vocational qualifications. This is true in both countries. Inter-
estingly, general maturity graduates who do not possess any vocational qualification
show to have a particularly high earnings dispersion in both countries. Thus, it
2 Note, however, that this category comprises almost 18 percent of the population in France in
2000, against less than 1 percent in Germany.
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Table 1: Typology of educational attainment
Highest degree obtained
Level 1 No vocational qualification
10 No degree
11 Lower secondary education
12 Intermediate secondary education
Level 2 Basic vocational qualification
20 No or lower secondary education + basic vocational degree
21 Intermediate secondary education + basic vocational degree
Level 3 Intermediate qualification
30 Intermediate vocational degree
31 Vocational maturity certificate
32 General maturity certificate
33 General maturity certificate + vocational degree
Level 4 Tertiary level qualification
40 Lower tertiary education
41 Upper tertiary education
Source: Lauer (2001)
Figure 2: Gross hourly earnings by detailed education level (2000)
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seems that vocational qualifications, as opposed to general qualifications, are asso-
ciated with a lower variance of earnings.
Overall, the descriptive analysis provided first evidence that not only the level of
earnings varies across education levels and types but also their variance. This will
be further analysed in the subsequent econometric analysis.
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3 Modelling framework
Most empirical studies that examine the link between education and private earnings
are imbedded in the human capital theory as pioneered by Becker (1964) and Mincer
(1974). The basic idea of the human capital theory is that the acquisition of educa-
tion, or more generally of human capital, can be viewed as an investment in the sense
that a current earnings sacrifice or cost is incurred in order for a future benefit. The
costs consist primarily of the foregone earnings arising from the time diverted from
the labour market to acquire the incremental human capital unit, but there might
also be direct costs. The benefits arise through the extra earnings obtained from
additional education during the working life. The latter aspect is the object of this
study. To be more specific, the aim is here to investigate for France and Germany
how educational attainment is rewarded in terms of earnings, abstracting from the
other factors that might affect earnings and education. Doing so, one can estimate
what I call here the earnings premium for education, i.e. the effect of attaining a
specific education level on the earnings prospects, anything else being equal.
Particular efforts have been put in not only modelling the average effect of edu-
cation on earnings, but also its impact in terms of earnings dispersion. The latter
aspect has been relatively little investigated in the literature until now. Besides, it
is known that there are substantial differences between France and Germany in the
access to employment, regarding both labour force participation and the incidence of
unemployment (see for instance Lauer and Weber, 2003 and Lauer, 2003a). There-
fore, neglecting the effect of selectivity into employment, which conditions whether
we observe labour earnings, could bias the estimated earnings premium for educa-
tion or its effect on earnings dispersion. This is why the selectivity into employment
will be explicitly modelled here.
3.1 A sample selection model with multiple heteroscedas-
ticity
The first step of the model development consists in using a standard extension of
Mincer (1974)’s so as to take selectivity into employment into account. Let the model
be defined as follows:
ln y1i = xiβ + ε1i if y
∗
2i > 0 (1)
ln y1i = not observed if y
∗
2i ≤ 0
y∗2i = ziγ + ε2i (2)
y2i = 1 if y
∗
2i > 0
y2i = 0 if y
∗
2i ≤ 0
y1i is the variable indicating the earnings perceived by individual i, i ∈ {1...N}.
y1i is assumed to be a linear function of some human capital variables contained in
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the vector xi and some unobserved component ε1i. β is the vector of coefficients - to
be estimated - that describe the way the explanatory variables affect the expected
earnings. The earnings can only be observed for people who actually perceive earn-
ings, which is indicated by the binary variable y2i, which takes the value 1 if the
earnings of individual i are observed and 0 otherwise. y∗2i is the corresponding latent
- continuous - variable which describes the propensity to be selected in the sample
of observations for which earnings are observed. The selection propensity depends
in a linear way on some variables contained in the vector zi, the effect of which
being captured by the coefficient vector γ, and on some unobserved factors ε2i. If
the selection process and the determination of wages were independent from each
other, one could estimate the equations separately without bias. However, the sam-
ple of individuals for whom we observe earnings might not be a random sample of
the whole population. Therefore, instead of assuming the independence of the error
terms of the selection and of the wage equation, I will assume, in the spirit of Heck-
man (1979), that they are jointly distributed with a bivariate normal distribution
of the following form:(
ε1i
ε2i
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ21i %σ1i
%σ1i σ
2
2i
))
(3)
where N denotes the bivariate normal distribution function. % measures the corre-
lation between ε1i and ε2i. This correlation will be allowed to differ across a limited
number of population groups (e.g. here between men and women % = %menor%women).
Two types of observations enter the likelihood function of the model described by
equations (1) and (2): the observations for which no earnings are observed, and the
observations for which the earnings are observed. The likelihood for the complete
sample is then:
(4)
L =
n0∏
i=1
1− Φ(ziγ/σ2i)
N∏
i=n0+1
1
σ1i
φ
(
y1i − xiβ
σ1i
)
Φ
ziγ + (%/σ1i)(y1i − xiβ)√
σ22i − %2

where there are n0 observations for which earnings are not observed and N − n0
observations for which earnings are observed.
The sample selection model described above requires some further assumption
onto the variances in order to be identifiable and estimable empirically. A widely used
assumption in the empirical literature is the homoscedasticity of the disturbances,
both for the selection and for the main equation. As a result, σ1i simplifies to σ1
and σ2i to σ2. Moreover, σ2 is typically normalised to 1, without loss of generality,
because in the probit equation, γ and σ2 are not separately identified but only the
ratio γ/σ2 is identified. This homoscedasticity assumption makes the estimation
far easier from a practical point of view but gives rise to some problems in the
context of the present study. First, both estimation are estimated simultaneously by
maximum likelihood. As soon as the model is non linear, the estimated coefficients
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themselves are biased in the presence of heteroscedasticity, not only the standard
errors. Moreover, the model should allow the modelling of the effect of education on
the residual dispersion, not only on levels. Therefore, the specification of the model
will be adapted to allow the disturbances to be heteroscedastic, both in the selection
nor in the earnings equation. Here, a multiplicative form of heteroscedasticity is used,
which is known (e.g. Greene (2000), p.518) to be a very flexible and general model:
lnσ21i = x
h
i β
h (5)
lnσ22i = z
h
i γ
h
The vector xhi includes a constant term β
h
0 . Thus, if x
h
i contains a set of dummy
variables, one of which - the base group - having been left out, then, exp(βh0 ) provides
an estimator of the disturbance variance for the base group and the other coefficients
of βh indicate in which direction and how far the disturbance variance of the other
categories deviates from that of the reference group. For σ22i to be normalisable to
1, failing which the model is not identified, zhi should not entail a constant term. σ
2
1i
and σ21i can be replaced by the expressions (5) in the log likelihood function defined
in equation (4).
3.2 Computation of level and dispersion effects of education
on earnings
Let us concretise the model presented in the following way:
xi = [1, educ, educ× female, female, x˜i] (6)
β = [β0, β1, β2, β3, β˜]
and
xhi = [1, educ, educ× female, female, x˜hi ] (7)
βh = [βh0 , β
h
1 , β
h
2 , β
h
3 , β˜
h]
where female is a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual is a women,
and educ is a vector depicting educational attainment as a set of dummy variables
the meaning of which can be read in table 1:
educ = [level 12, level 20, level 21, level 30, level 31, (8)
level 32, level 33, level 40, level 41]
educ× female is the vector of interactions between female and educ. x˜i and x˜ih
are the vectors comprising all other explanatory variables, β˜ and β˜h the correspond-
ing coefficients vectors. Thus, equations (1) can be rewritten as:
ln y1i = β0 + β1educ+ β2educ× female+ β3female (9)
+ x˜iβ˜ + ε1i if y
∗
2i > 0
ln y1i = not observed if y
∗
2i ≤ 0
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and the scedastic equation (5) as:
lnσ21i = β
h
0 + β
h
1 educ+ β
h
2 educ× female+ βh3 female+ x˜hi β˜h (10)
The coefficients of the education variables in equations (9) and (10) give a measure
of the effects of education on the expected level of earnings (called average earnings
premium her, or AEP, with a standard error SE(AEP)) and on their unexplained
dispersion (called earnings dispersion effect here or EDE, with a standard error
SE(EDE)) respectively. The estimated effects of the attaining the education level
considered are to be interpreted in reference to the group of individuals with poor
(level 10 or 11) education.
The earnings premium obtained for a same education level on average might
differ between men and women. For men, the effects can be read directly from the
estimated coefficients and standard errors:
AEPmen = βˆ1 (11)
SE(AEP )men =
√
var(βˆ1)
EDEmen = βˆh1 (12)
SE(EDE)men =
√
var(βˆh1 )
For women, the effects of education on earnings cannot be read directly from the
table of coefficients, but can be computed as:
AEPwomen = βˆ1 + βˆ2 (13)
SE(AEP )women =
√
var(βˆ1) + var(βˆ1) + 2cov(βˆ1, βˆ2)
EDEwomen = βˆh1 + βˆ
h
2 (14)
SE(EDE)women =
√
var(βˆh1 ) + var(βˆ
h
1 ) + 2cov(βˆ
h
1 , βˆ
h
2 )
where female is the proportion of females in the sample.
The overall level and dispersion effects of education, regardless of gender, can
therefore be computed as:
AEPall = βˆ1 + female βˆ2 (15)
SE(AEP )all =
√
var(βˆ1) + female
2
var(βˆ1) + 2 female cov(βˆ1, βˆ2)
EDEall = βˆh1 + female βˆ
h
2 (16)
SE(EDE)all =
√
var(βˆh1 ) + female
2
var(βˆh1 ) + 2 female cov(βˆ
h
1 , βˆ
h
2 )
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Thus, the maximisation3 of the resulting log-likelihood function permits to get
estimates of the effects of education on earnings both in terms of level and of disper-
sion, while differentiating both aspects according to selected observed characteristics
such as gender and controlling for (gender-specific) selection into employment.
4 Data and variables
As mentioned at the beginning of section 2, the empirical analysis is based on a
sample of individuals (nationals or born in the respective country) aged 25 to 55
drawn from the Emploi survey for France and from the GSOEP data for Germany.
The econometric analysis uses the waves 1991 to 2000, since no continuous measure
of earnings is available before this date in the French data set4. The dependent
variable for the earnings equation (1) is the logarithm of the gross hourly earnings
such as defined in section 25. For the selection equation, the dependent variable
is defined by a binary variable indicating whether the information on gross hourly
earnings is available for the individual considered.
Table 2 provides a synthetic overview of the explanatory variables used for the
econometric analysis, distinguishing between variables included in both the selection
and the earnings equation, variables included only in the earnings equation and
variables included only in the selection equation. Special attention has been paid to
using the same variables for both countries and defining them in a way as similar
as possible. Summary statistics for all the variables used are provided in appendix
(table 5).
Education6 and gender, as well as interactions between them, are the key vari-
3 See in Gould and Sribney (1999) how to programme maximum likelihood estimations with the
software package Stata.
4 Because both the GSOEP and the Emploi survey are longitudinal data sets, one might think of
exploiting the repeated observations of same individuals over time to isolate individual effects.
However, random effects estimates are inconsistent because the individual effects are correlated
with the regressors and fixed effect or first differences estimators cannot be used because gender
and education are basically time-invariant. If one assumes that the unobserved individual factors
have a similar effect in both countries, however, the comparison of the results across countries
should be little affected.
5 The earnings in the years preceding the introduction of the Euro have been converted in Ecus.
The earnings have then been deflated on the basis of the consumer price index so that all
earnings are expressed in prices of 2000.
6 The endogeneity of schooling in earnings equation and the correction of the bias caused by
it has been the object of numerous studies (e.g. Card, 2000). However, the literature leads to
controversial conclusions as to the optimal correction of the endogeneity problem, one important
problem lying in the non-availability of valid instruments (see Lauer and Steiner, 2001; Card,
2000; Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2003). Therefore, as in Harmon, Hogan and Walker (2003)
education is considered exogenous, conditional on the other explanatory variables. This should
be a minor problem here since the inclusion of father’s occupation as additional explanatory
factor is likely to reduce the endogeneity problem and the focus of the analysis is on comparing
the hierarchy and the dispersion of the earnings premia for different education levels across
countries rather than determining their absolute levels.
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ables included in the selection and earnings equations, both in the level component
and in the scedastic equation to examine how the earnings level and unexplained
variance depend on education and whether this effect depends on gender. Further
key variables, age and a yearly trend, have been added in the scedastic function as
Table 2: Explanatory variables
Variables Definition
Variables common to both the selection and the earnings equation
Education level 10 categories: level 10/11; level 12; level 20; level 21;
level 30; level 31; level 32; level 33; level 40; level 41
(see table 1)
Sex 2 categories: female; male
Age polynome: age; age squared
Current quarter Germany: 3 categories: 1st quarter (January to March);
2nd quarter (April to June); 3rd/4th quarter (July to
December)
France: 2 categories: 1st quarter (January to March);
2nd/4th quarter (April to December)
Time trend 10 year dummies: 1991 to 2000
Variables specific to the earnings equation
Tenure polynome: years of tenure; years of tenure squared
Firm size 6 categories: <5 employees; 5-19 employees; 20-199
employees; 200-1999 employees; ≥2,000 employees;
missing
Industry 9 categories: industry (mechanical and electrical engi-
neering, stone, iron, steel and chemical industry, paper,
textile, food industry, other); agriculture/energy (agri-
culture, forestry, fishing, energy, mining); construction;
trade (wholesale and retail); banking (banking, insurance,
real estate); transports (transports and communications);
private services (personal services, eating and drinking,
other services to professionals or private households);
public services (welfare services, government, non-profit
institutions, other); missing
Fixed-term contract 2 categories: not fixed term; fixed term
Part-time employment 2 categories: full-time; part-time
Public employment 2 categories: private employment; public employment
Father’s occupation 7 categories: worker; farmer; self-employed; senior
manager; middle-level manager; employee; missing
to be continued...
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...table 2 continued
Variables Definition
Variables specific to the selection equation
Marital status 2 categories: married; not married
Number and age of 10 categories: no children; 1 child aged 6-17; 1 child aged
children below 18 3-5; 1 child aged 0-2; 2 children, youngest aged 6-17;
2 children, youngest aged 3-5; 2 children, youngest aged
0-2; more than 2 children, youngest aged 6-17; more
than 2 children, youngest aged 3-5; more than 2 children,
youngest aged 0-2
Partner’s education 4 categories: level 1; level 2; level 3; level 4 (see table 1)
Partner’s earnings gross monthly earnings (prices of 2000)
No info on partner’s 2 categories: information; no information
earnings
No partner 2 categories: partner; no partner
Home ownership 2 categories: owner of the house/appartment living in
(himself or spouse); not owner
City size 3 categories: fewer than 20,000 inhabitants; between 20
and 100,000 inhabitants; 100,000 inhabitants or more
well to clean the estimates from these effects7. Further control variables have been
included as reported in table 2in the main equations for both earnings and the se-
lection process in order to control for observed heterogeneity and isolate the labour
market reward of education if everything else is equal.
Let us now turn to the estimation results. Both equations (2) and (1) have been
estimated simultaneously as well as the correlation between them through the max-
imisation of the log-likelihood function (4), where both the level and the variance of
earnings is allowed to differ by education and gender according to the function (5).
The correlation is allowed to be different for men and women.
5 Selectivity into paid employment
This section presents the results concerning selectivity into paid employment. Table
6 in appendix reports overall statistics as well as the results of specification tests for
the selection equation. Only the variables that are significant at the 10 percent level
at least have been finally retained in the equation. It appears that the determinants
of the employment propensity differ significantly across genders. The hypothesis of
homoscedastic disturbances is also strongly rejected. Moreover, judging from the
7 In principle, one could include all explanatory variables of the main equation in the scedastic
equation as well, but the number of variables should not be too high to leave enough variation in
the scedastic terms. Several experiments with more variables in the scedastic equation showed
that the estimates of the impact education are hardly affected, but the estimates become less
robust if the number of variables is too high, especially for Germany.
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result of the corresponding test8, the exclusion restrictions seem reasonably valid
(see Puhani, 2000).
Table 3 reports the full estimation results for the selection equation. In the upper
part of the table, the mean effects are reported, i.e. the coefficients estimated for
vector γ (see equation (2)). The lower part of the table reports the dispersion effects,
i.e. the coefficients estimated for the scedastic function (vector γh, see equation (5)).
Since the focus of the study is on education and earnings, the comments concentrate
on the impact of education, differentiated by gender, on the propensity of selection
into paid employment and on the impact of selectivity on the estimated education-
earnings link. The effect of the other variables can be read from table 3 and will not
be further commented here.
The effect of educational attainment on the propensity to be engaged in paid
employment differs between men and women. For men, the effect of education can
be read directly from the coefficients of the education variables reported in table
3. In Germany, the probability of being employed for men with level 12 education
(Realschule degree) does not differ significantly from that of the reference group, but
from this level onwards, it rather increases with education. In France also, the work
propensity of men rather tends to increase with education. Thus, poorly qualified
men (level 10 and 11) have the lowest, tertiary level graduates the highest selection
propensity. However, the coefficients are smaller in scope for French men compared
to their German counterparts, which indicates that education is less discriminatory
as regards access to employment there. Overall, women have ceteris paribus a lower
probability of being employed, especially in France, as can be seen from the effect
of the female dummy. In both countries, however, the positive and significant effect
of the female-education interactions indicate that education has more discrimina-
tory power for women than for men in terms of access to employment. Moreover,
the coefficients of the interactions are larger in magnitude for France than for Ger-
many. Thus, being a woman reduces more strongly the employment propensity in
France than in Germany, but education increases it more for French than for Ger-
man women9. In particular, French women with a university degree of upper tertiary
level (level 41) are much more likely to be in paid employment than more poorly
educated women.
Not only does education play a role in terms of average propensity of working,
but also in terms of unexplained dispersion of this work propensity, after observable
characteristics have been controlled for. Here, the effects are very much different dif-
ferent for men and women (see bottom of table 3). For men, attaining a higher level
8 The test used here is the R2 of an estimation of the inverse Mill’s ratio (computed as
φ(ziγ/σ2i)/Φ(ziγ/σ2i)) on the regressors of the earnings equation. If the R2 appears to be too
high (at levels above 0.70 for instance), this is an indication of the weakness of the exclusion
restrictions.
9 Note that the relative educational attainment of women compared to men is better in France
than in Germany, which contributes to explaining that the labour force participation of women
is overall higher in France than in Germany.
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Table 3: Determinants of selection into paid employment
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Mean effects (γ):
Education (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Level 12 -0.07 (0.07) 0.08∗∗ (0.03)
Level 20 0.34∗∗ (0.09) 0.00 (0.01)
Level 21 0.29∗∗ (0.10) 0.09∗∗ (0.02)
Level 30 0.39∗∗ (0.11) 0.00 (0.04)
Level 31 0.18 (0.11) 0.09∗ (0.04)
Level 32 -0.37 (1.25) 0.11∗∗ (0.04)
Level 33 0.64∗ (0.25) 0.08 (0.09)
Level 40 0.75∗∗ (0.18) 0.34∗∗ (0.04)
Level 41 0.86∗∗ (0.22) 0.16∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 12 1.20∗∗ (0.12) 0.21∗∗ (0.03)
Female * Level 20 0.11 (0.09) 0.23∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 21 0.46∗∗ (0.10) 0.32∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 30 0.55∗∗ (0.12) 0.36∗∗ (0.04)
Female * Level 31 0.42∗∗ (0.13) 0.50∗∗ (0.04)
Female * Level 32 0.24 (2.27) 0.35∗∗ (0.04)
Female * Level 33 0.07 (0.30) 0.48∗∗ (0.10)
Female * Level 40 0.61∗∗ (0.21) 0.49∗∗ (0.05)
Female * Level 41 0.14 (0.21) 1.00∗∗ (0.04)
Female -1.61∗∗ (0.50) -2.75∗∗ (0.10)
Age and marital status
Age/10 0.24† (0.12) 0.13∗∗ (0.04)
Age squared/100 -0.07∗∗ (0.02) -0.01∗ (0.00)
Female * Age/10 1.06∗∗ (0.27) 1.23∗∗ (0.05)
Female * Age squared/100 -0.14∗∗ (0.03) -0.16∗∗ (0.01)
Married 0.13∗∗ (0.04) 0.22∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Married -0.55∗∗ (0.08) -0.42∗∗ (0.01)
Number and age of children (ref.: No children)
One child aged 6-17 -0.05 (0.04) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
One child aged 3-5 -0.06 (0.06) 0.05∗∗ (0.01)
One child aged 0-2 -0.09 (0.06) 0.09∗∗ (0.01)
Two children, youngest 6-17 -0.07 (0.05) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Two children, youngest 3-5 0.00 (0.06) 0.07∗∗ (0.01)
Two children, youngest 0-2 0.02 (0.07) 0.09∗∗ (0.01)
More children, youngest 6-17 -0.22∗∗ (0.08) 0.07∗∗ (0.01)
More children, youngest 3-5 -0.23∗∗ (0.09) 0.06∗∗ (0.02)
More children, youngest 0-2 -0.26∗∗ (0.09) 0.09∗∗ (0.02)
Female * One child aged 6-17 -0.48∗∗ (0.07) -0.13∗∗ (0.01)
Female * One child aged 3-5 -1.10∗∗ (0.13) -0.17∗∗ (0.02)
to be continued...
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...table 3 continued
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Female * One child aged 0-2 -2.22∗∗ (0.22) -0.29∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Two children, youngest 6-17 -0.77∗∗ (0.10) -0.27∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Two children, youngest 3-5 -1.66∗∗ (0.17) -0.43∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Two children, youngest 0-2 -2.86∗∗ (0.27) -0.68∗∗ (0.02)
Female * More children, youngest 6-17 -1.26∗∗ (0.16) -0.71∗∗ (0.02)
Female * More children, youngest 3-5 -1.91∗∗ (0.22) -0.97∗∗ (0.03)
Female * More children, youngest 0-2 -2.88∗∗ (0.31) -1.26∗∗ (0.04)
Partner’s education (ref.: Level 1)
Level 2 0.06∗ (0.03) 0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Level 3 0.04 (0.03) -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Level 4 -0.08† (0.04) -0.12∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 2 -0.02† (0.01)
Female * Level 3 0.01 (0.01)
Female * Level 4 -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
Partner’s earnings
Gross monthly earnings/1,000 0.01 (0.02) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Gross monthly earnings/1,000 -0.05∗∗ (0.02) -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
No information on partner’s earnings -1.05∗∗ (0.09) -0.45∗∗ (0.01)
Ownership status (ref.: Not owner)
Owner 0.19∗∗ (0.03) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Owner -0.31∗∗ (0.05) -0.15∗∗ (0.01)
City size (ref.: <20.000 inh.)
20-100,000 inhabitants 0.14∗∗ (0.03) 0.15∗∗ (0.01)
≥100,000 inhabitants 0.14∗∗ (0.03) 0.20∗∗ (0.01)
Female * 20-100,000 inhabitants -0.22∗∗ (0.05) -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Female * ≥100,000 inhabitants -0.12∗ (0.05) -0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Current quarter (ref.: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter -0.20∗∗ (0.03) -0.11∗∗ (0.02)
3rd/4th quarter -0.35∗∗ (0.04)
Female * 2nd quarter 0.19∗∗ (0.03)
Year (ref.: 2000)
1991 0.46∗∗ (0.05) -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
1992 0.43∗∗ (0.05) -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
1993 0.49∗∗ (0.06) -0.09∗∗ (0.01)
1994 0.47∗∗ (0.05) -0.09∗∗ (0.01)
1995 0.43∗∗ (0.05) -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
1996 0.46∗∗ (0.05) -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
1997 0.45∗∗ (0.05) -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
1998 0.45∗∗ (0.05) -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
1999 0.53∗∗ (0.06) -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
to be continued...
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...table 3 continued
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Female * 1991 0.00 (0.02)
Female * 1992 0.02 (0.02)
Female * 1993 0.05∗∗ (0.02)
Female * 1994 0.05∗∗ (0.02)
Female * 1995 0.04∗ (0.02)
Female * 1996 0.05∗∗ (0.02)
Female * 1997 0.03† (0.02)
Female * 1998 0.02 (0.02)
Female * 1999 0.03† (0.02)
Constant -0.04 (0.35) 1.10∗∗ (0.07)
Dispersion effects (γh):
Education (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Level 12 -0.86∗∗ (0.20) 0.60∗∗ (0.08)
Level 20 0.45∗ (0.18) 0.02 (0.04)
Level 21 0.25 (0.21) 0.42∗∗ (0.07)
Level 30 0.52∗ (0.21) 0.67∗∗ (0.14)
Level 31 0.04 (0.26) 0.51∗∗ (0.10)
Level 32 2.58 (5.31) 0.93∗∗ (0.12)
Level 33 1.06∗ (0.43) 0.96∗∗ (0.28)
Level 40 0.78∗∗ (0.29) 1.08∗∗ (0.09)
Level 41 1.11∗∗ (0.31) 0.73∗∗ (0.07)
Female * Level 12 0.78∗∗ (0.27) -0.51∗∗ (0.09)
Female * Level 20 -1.01∗∗ (0.22) -0.09† (0.05)
Female * Level 21 -0.97∗∗ (0.24) -0.35∗∗ (0.08)
Female * Level 30 -0.82∗∗ (0.26) -0.74∗∗ (0.17)
Female * Level 31 -0.10 (0.32) -0.34∗∗ (0.12)
Female * Level 32 -1.74 (5.33) -0.67∗∗ (0.13)
Female * Level 33 -1.04∗ (0.46) -0.46 (0.31)
Female * Level 40 -0.46 (0.37) -0.30∗∗ (0.10)
Female * Level 41 -0.62† (0.35) -0.55∗∗ (0.10)
Female 0.97∗∗ (0.21) 0.34∗∗ (0.05)
Age/10 0.01 (0.02) -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Trend -0.02∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Correlation between selection and earnings equation (%):
Female -0.25∗∗ (0.06) -0.14∗∗ (0.02)
Male -0.57∗∗ (0.06) -0.40∗∗ (0.01)
Tests on correlation
%: Male = Female 14.89 (0.00) 154.10 (0.00)
% = 0 97.60 (0.00) 1,318.85 (0.00)
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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of educational attainment increases the unexplained dispersion in the participation
propensity, everything else being equal. This is true in both France and Germany. In
particular, men with an education level beyond the maturity certificate have a sig-
nificantly higher residual dispersion in employment participation than more poorly
educated men. Being a woman is associated with a higher unexplained dispersion
of the propensity of working compared to men, especially in Germany. However,
contrary to men, attaining a higher level of educational attainment reduces the
unexplained dispersion in the work propensity among women.
To sum up, selectivity is at work and the selection process is affected by the
education level. If the selection into paid employment proved not to have an impact
on the estimates determinants of earnings, then, the earnings equation could (and
should, for efficiency reasons) be estimated on its own. As is reported at the bottom
of table 3, the hypothesis that the correlation % between the unobserved factors of
the selection and the earnings equations is zero, i.e. the hypothesis that there is no
selectivity effect, is strongly rejected. Thus, it is important to model the selection into
employment together with the earnings, otherwise the coefficients might be biased.
Moreover, the correlation between selection into paid employment and earnings was
allowed to differ between men and women, since there is no a priori reason to
assume that the correlation with earnings should be the same for men and women.
As a matter of fact, a further test shows that the correlation does differ for men and
women. This is why a gender specific correlation term has been estimated for both
countries. The correlation proves to be highly significant and negative for both men
and women and stronger for women than for men in both countries.
Given that there is evidence of selectivity effects affecting the determination of
earnings, the question which arises now is whether this selectivity affects the esti-
mates of the effects of education on earnings. To address this issue, the earnings
equation has been estimated again without correcting for selectivity bias10. Then,
the average earnings premia and the earnings dispersion effects of education, as well
as their standard errors have been computed as explained in section 3.2 on the basis
of the coefficients of the earnings equation estimated without correcting for selec-
tivity bias. The estimated average earnings premia and earnings dispersion effects
of education with and without correction for selectivity are reported in table 8 in
the appendix and the difference between them indicates the extent to which the
selectivity bias affects these estimates.
As can be seen, even if selectivity does not affect much the qualitative interpreta-
tion of the results, it has an impact on the magnitude of the estimates. The estimated
earnings premia for education are slightly higher when one does not correct for the
selectivity bias due to non-random selection into paid employment. For France, how-
ever, the difference is rather small, especially for men. For Germany, the difference
is a little bit higher, but this is also because the estimates are somewhat less precise
due to a smaller number of observations. The effect of education on earnings disper-
10 Results available upon request.
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sion also tend to be larger when omitting to correct for the selectivity bias. Here,
however, the effect is more marked for men than for women in both countries. The
following results are based on the selectivity-corrected equations since these are the
correct ones.
6 The earnings premium for education
As for the selection equation, the first step consisted here also in determining which
variables should be included in the earnings equation. To this end, the statistical
significance of the variables has been tested in a systematic way. Here again, only
the results of the joint tests are reported in table 7 in the appendix, whereas the
test results on the the statistical significance of separate variables appear directly
in the results table 4. The impact on earnings of almost all explanatory variables
differs significantly across genders. The hypothesis of a homoscedastic variance of
earnings is strongly rejected for both countries. In particular, it appears that the
level of educational attainment does not only affect the expected level of earnings,
but also the dispersion of earnings, and this in a different way for men and women.
Table 4 reports the whole estimation results of the earnings equation. The next
sections will present in detail the effect of education, differentiating between men
and women, both in terms of level (section 6.1) and in terms of dispersion (6.2). The
impact of the variables other than education can be read from the table and will
not be further commented here, since this is not the primary focus of this study.
6.1 Effect of education in terms of earnings level
In this part, the mean effect of education on earnings - called here the average
earnings premium AEP -is examined, drawing on the coefficients estimated and
presented in table 4 as explained in section 3.2. The aim is here to find out how much
additional earnings is associated, on average, with the attainment of a higher level
of education, if anything else is equal. The exact figures computed for each element
of AEP and SE(AEP ) for men, women and altogether, based on the estimates
obtained from the selectivity-corrected earnings equation are given in table 8 in the
appendix11. For illustration purposes, the average earnings premium for education
is represented graphically here (please consult table 8 to see the standard errors of
the estimated earnings premia).
Figure 3 pictures the average earnings premia for the various education levels
in France and Germany, irrespective of gender, calculated on the basis of equation
(15). As can be seen, attaining a higher education level than the reference level
yields a positive earnings premium in both countries. Though broadly speaking, the
higher the education level, the higher the reward in terms of earnings, the education-
earnings link is not monotonous. Looking into detail, one can see that a level 20
11 For comparison, the estimates computed on the basis of the regression without selectivity cor-
rection have been reported too.
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Table 4: Determinants of earnings (corrected for selectivity)
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Mean effects (β):
Education (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Level 12 0.13∗∗ (0.03) 0.18∗∗ (0.00)
Level 20 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.09∗∗ (0.00)
Level 21 0.21∗∗ (0.01) 0.17∗∗ (0.00)
Level 30 0.17∗∗ (0.01) 0.28∗∗ (0.01)
Level 31 0.17∗∗ (0.02) 0.27∗∗ (0.00)
Level 32 0.06 (0.08) 0.32∗∗ (0.01)
Level 33 0.13∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗ (0.01)
Level 40 0.43∗∗ (0.02) 0.41∗∗ (0.00)
Level 41 0.51∗∗ (0.02) 0.70∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Level 12 0.06† (0.04) -0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 20 0.12∗∗ (0.02) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Level 21 0.08∗∗ (0.02) 0.01† (0.01)
Female * Level 30 0.10∗∗ (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Female * Level 31 0.07∗ (0.03) 0.00 (0.01)
Female * Level 32 0.31∗∗ (0.10) 0.01 (0.01)
Female * Level 33 0.23∗∗ (0.03) 0.01 (0.01)
Female * Level 40 0.03 (0.03) 0.08∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 41 0.08∗∗ (0.03) 0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Female -0.52∗∗ (0.10) 0.13∗∗ (0.03)
Age/10 0.41∗∗ (0.03) 0.34∗∗ (0.01)
Age squared/100 -0.04∗∗ (0.00) -0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Age/10 0.03 (0.05) -0.18∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Age squared/100 -0.01 (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Tenure/10 0.11∗∗ (0.01) 0.13∗∗ (0.00)
Tenure squared/100 -0.02∗∗ (0.00) -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Tenure/10 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.07∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Tenure squared/100 -0.01∗ (0.01) -0.00∗∗ (0.00)
Firm size (ref.: <5 employees)
5-19 employees 0.14∗∗ (0.01) -0.04∗∗ (0.00)
20-199 employees 0.23∗∗ (0.01) -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
200-1999 employees 0.28∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
≥2000 employees 0.33∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗ (0.00)
Missing information 0.11∗∗ (0.04) 0.10∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 5-19 employees 0.07∗∗ (0.02) 0.07∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 20-199 employees 0.08∗∗ (0.02) 0.05∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 200-1999 employees 0.10∗∗ (0.02) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Female * ≥2000 employees 0.11∗∗ (0.02) 0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Missing information 0.09 (0.06) -0.07∗∗ (0.01)
to be continued...
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...table 4 continued
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Industry branch (ref.: Industry or missing)
Agriculture, energy -0.01 (0.01) -0.08∗∗ (0.00)
Construction -0.01 (0.01) -0.06∗∗ (0.00)
Trade -0.12∗∗ (0.01) -0.06∗∗ (0.00)
Banking 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Transports -0.16∗∗ (0.01) -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Private services -0.25∗∗ (0.03) -0.05∗∗ (0.00)
Public services -0.09∗∗ (0.01) -0.09∗∗ (0.00)
Missing information -0.02 (0.03) -0.18∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Agriculture, energy -0.04 (0.03) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Construction -0.01 (0.03) 0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Trade 0.03∗ (0.01) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Banking 0.06∗∗ (0.02) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Transports 0.12∗∗ (0.02) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Private services -0.01 (0.03) -0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Public services 0.17∗∗ (0.02) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Missing information -0.06 (0.04) 0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Type of employment
Fixed-term contract -0.19∗∗ (0.01) -0.14∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Fixed-term contract 0.01 (0.02) 0.05∗∗ (0.01)
Part-time employment 0.11∗∗ (0.02) 0.12∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Part-time employment -0.15∗∗ (0.02) -0.10∗∗ (0.00)
Public employment -0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Public employment 0.07† (0.02) 0.06∗∗ (0.00)
Father’s occupation (ref.: Worker)
Farmer -0.04∗∗ (0.01) -0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Self-employed 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Senior manager 0.07∗∗ (0.01) 0.09∗∗ (0.00)
Middle manager 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗ (0.00)
Employee 0.04∗∗ (0.01) 0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Missing information -0.06∗∗ (0.01) -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Farmer 0.04∗∗ (0.03) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Self-employed 0.03† (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)
Female * Senior manager -0.02 (0.02) -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Female * Middle manager -0.02 (0.01) -0.01∗ (0.00)
Female * Employee 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)
Female * Missing information 0.02† (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Current quarter (ref.: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
3rd/4th quarter 0.07∗∗ (0.01)
Year (ref.: 2000)
1991 -0.11∗∗ (0.01) -0.03∗∗ (0.00)
to be continued...
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...table 4 continued
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
1992 -0.10∗∗ (0.01) -0.02∗∗ (0)
1993 -0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
1994 -0.04∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
1995 0.02† (0.01) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
1996 0.02† (0.01) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
1997 -0.03∗∗ (0.01) -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
1998 -0.04∗∗ (0.01) -0.03∗∗ (0.00)
1999 -0.02∗ (0.01) -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 1991 0.00 (0.01)
Female * 1992 0.00 (0.01)
Female * 1993 -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 1994 -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Female * 1995 -0.01∗ (0.00)
Female * 1996 -0.01† (0.00)
Female * 1997 0.00 (0.00)
Female * 1998 -0.01 (0.00)
Female * 1999 0.01∗ (0.00)
Constant 1.54∗∗ (0.07) 1.23∗∗ (0.02)
Dispersion effects (βh):
Education (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Level 12 0.13∗ (0.06) 0.09∗∗ (0.01)
Level 20 -0.15∗ (0.06) -0.07∗∗ (0.01)
Level 21 -0.10∗∗ (0.04) -0.05∗∗ (0.01)
Level 30 -0.02 (0.07) 0.07∗∗ (0.03)
Level 31 0.32∗∗ (0.08) 0.01 (0.02)
Level 32 0.53∗∗ (0.16) 0.34∗∗ (0.02)
Level 33 0.17† (0.09) 0.11∗∗ (0.04)
Level 40 0.30∗∗ (0.08) 0.08∗∗ (0.01)
Level 41 0.63∗∗ (0.07) 0.60∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 12 -0.46∗∗ (0.15) -0.08∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 20 -0.40∗∗ (0.08) -0.07∗∗ (0.01)
Female * Level 21 -0.43∗∗ (0.08) -0.20∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 30 -0.63∗∗ (0.09) -0.40∗∗ (0.04)
Female * Level 31 -0.93∗∗ (0.12) -0.27∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 32 -0.73∗∗ (0.21) -0.33∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 33 -0.37∗∗ (0.11) -0.32∗∗ (0.05)
Female * Level 40 -0.44∗∗ (0.11) -0.31∗∗ (0.02)
Female * Level 41 -0.72∗∗ (0.09) -0.18∗∗ (0.02)
Female 0.90∗∗ (0.07) 0.16∗∗ (0.01)
Age 0.07∗∗ (0.01) 0.19∗∗ (0.01)
Trend 0.02∗∗ (0.00) -0.02∗∗ (0.00)
Constant -2.54∗∗ (0.06) -2.20∗∗ (0.01)
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Figure 3: Average earnings premium for education (Ref.: Level 10 or 11)
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qualification (no or lower secondary education + basic vocational degree) yields a
smaller earnings premium than level 12 qualification (intermediate secondary edu-
cation without any vocational qualification) in Germany and in France alike. Thus,
it seems that the employers attach more value to the attainment of a minimum level
of general education than to the acquisition of a vocational qualification. A reason
for this might be that the quality of the completed vocational training might de-
pend on the level attained in general education or that a minimum level of general
education is necessary to show enough learning flexibility on the job. In any case, it
is, on average, more worth it in terms of earnings to strive for attaining at least an
intermediate level of general education rather than, having a poor general education,
to opt for a basic vocational degree.
In France, there is not much difference in the earnings premium for education
level 12 and for education level 21, i.e. whether individuals with an intermediate
secondary education have or do not have a basic vocational degree. This means that
in France a basic vocational degree has some value only if one has an extremely
poor level of secondary education (i.e. a basic vocational degree is ”better than
nothing”), but as soon as one has attained intermediate secondary schooling, this
becomes irrelevant. This is different in Germany, where Realschule graduates (i.e.
intermediate secondary schooling) enjoy a positive earnings premium for completing
a basic vocational qualification, as can be seen from the significantly higher earnings
premium for level 21 than for level 12. Thus, the skills provided by the vocational
education system seem to be more highly valued by the labour market in Germany
than in France. This is confirmed by the observation that basic vocational education
(level 2) better leads to a higher earnings premium on average in Germany. Again,
this might be explained by the fact that vocational education in Germany is more
tightly linked to the needs of the labour market while it remains rather theoretical
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in France and less connected to the job market. In this context, it becomes more
essential to reach a minimum level of general education based on which one can
train more easily on-the-job.
In Germany, the completion of an intermediate level qualification (level 3 qualifi-
cations) does not yield any additional earnings premium. Thus, advanced vocational
qualifications bring a further advantage in terms of employment (see Lauer, 2003a),
but less so in terms of earnings. By contrast, in France, intermediate vocational
qualifications bring about an additional earnings premium compared to basic ones,
though it makes no difference if these have the status of a maturity certificate (level
31) or not (level 30). Moreover, unlike in Germany, the completion of the general
maturity certificate (Baccalaure´at Ge´ne´ral, level 32 and 33) as such is rewarded in
terms of earnings, though the additional premium obtained for it is rather small.
This confirms the well-known high status of the French Baccalaure´at.
In both countries, higher education degrees yield a high earnings premium on av-
erage, anything else equal. Thus, there is a large gap between the average earnings
premium of tertiary level degrees and that of qualifications below this level. Level 40
degrees, i.e. lower tertiary level degrees yield a same reward in France and Germany,
though in the classification of educational degrees, the requirement level of these
level 40 degrees is lower in France (2 years after Baccalaure´at) than in Germany (4
years after (Fach)Hochschulreife). The earnings premium for upper tertiary educa-
tion is much higher in France than in Germany, though study duration is typically
shorter. This is most probably the effect of the presence of the Grandes Ecoles,
which comprise about 30 percent of higher education graduates and are specifically
designed at meeting the demand of the economy for high level positions.
Let us know have a look at gender differences in the average earnings premium
for education. Judging from the coefficient of the female dummy in table 4, women
ceteris paribus lower earnings in Germany, whereas it affects earnings positively in
France if anything else is hold constant, meaning that for given other characteristics
and rewards of these characteristics, French women would perceive slightly higher
earnings than their male counterparts on average.
We know that the educational attainment of women is poorer than that of men
in Germany and to a lesser extent also in France (Lauer, 2003b). However, looking
at figure 4 and figure 5, it appears that, on the whole, a same level of educational
attainment is more highly rewarded for women than for men in terms of earnings.
This is true in both countries, though the gender gap in the average earnings pre-
mium for education is significantly larger in Germany than in France. Particularly in
Germany, women are more poorly endowed in human capital - at least as measured
by educational attainment - but they enjoy a significantly more favourable reward
of their education. The gender gap in the average earnings premium for education
does not have the same extent for all education levels. In Germany, women have a
higher premium than men for all education levels, but the gap is particularly large
for level 32 and level 33, i.e. for holders of the general maturity certificate (Abitur).
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Figure 4: Average earnings premium by gender (Ref.: Level 10 or 11) - Germany
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Figure 5: Average earnings premium by gender (Ref.: Level 10 or 11) - France
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It is much less pronounced for tertiary education graduates. In France, the earn-
ings premia for basic and advanced vocational qualifications are nearly the same for
French men and women. However, there is a significant gap in favour of women in
the earnings premium for tertiary level qualifications, especially lower tertiary ones.
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6.2 Effect of education in terms of unexplained earnings
dispersion
The previous section showed what earnings premium can be expected from investing
in a certain education level, anything else equal. However, it also matters whether
the educational investment also affects the unexplained earnings dispersion to be
expected. Indeed, the residual earnings dispersion can be seen as a measure of the
remaining earnings uncertainty or earnings risk. As previously, the estimated earn-
ings dispersion effects for each level of educational attainment relative to the ref-
erence level 10/11 as well as the associated standard errors are given in table 9 in
the appendix. Here, the estimates of the elements of EDE are represented graphi-
cally, without the standard errors. Figure 7 shows for France and Germany the effect
that is caused, irrespective of gender, by the attainment of a specific education level
rather than no or only a low level school degree, computed on the basis of formula
(16).
Figure 6: Earnings dispersion effect of education (Ref.: Level 10 or 11)
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The pattern of earnings dispersion effects of education exhibit some similarities
in France and Germany. In both countries, attaining level 12 (i.e. intermediate sec-
ondary schooling) has only a small effect, negative12 in Germany and positive in
France, in terms of earnings dispersion compared to having a poorer education.
However, the completion of vocational qualifications (level 20 to level 31) signif-
icantly reduces the earnings risk as measured by the residual earnings dispersion.
The effects of vocational education on earnings dispersion are larger in magnitude in
Germany than in France13. Maybe this is because the vocational maturity certificate
12 Judging from the standard error reported in table 9, the small effect found for Germany is
hardly significant in statistical terms.
13 Note, however, that the standard errors are also larger.
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is less closely connected to the labour market than dual qualification forms. Thus,
the completion of a vocational qualification not only yields an earnings premium,
anything else equal, but also reduces the earnings risk significantly, particularly in
Germany.
A further commonality is that in France and in Germany alike, individuals having
at most the general maturity certificate (level 32) face a comparatively higher earn-
ings dispersion. This might be due to the fact that this qualification level certifies
the acquisition of general skills which might lead to very different types of occupa-
tions that are likely to bring about different levels of earnings. This interpretation
is consistent with the observation that on the whole, no significant effect regarding
earnings dispersion, compared to the reference group, is found for those who com-
pleted a vocational qualification in addition to the general maturity certificate (level
33): the dispersion-enhancing effect of the general maturity certificate level is offset
by the dispersion-reducing effect of a vocational qualification.
In France as in Germany, upper tertiary level graduates are those who face the
highest earnings dispersion, especially in France. Interestingly, they face a higher
earnings risk than the lower tertiary level graduates. This might be due to the fact
that lower tertiary qualifications are typically rather focussed on the needs of the
labour market. By contrast, the upper tertiary level includes on the one hand some
general study tracks that are not really designed to meet the needs of employers and
the graduates of which might experience difficulties in finding a job or at least a
well rewarded job. On the other hand, this category also entails those highly skilled
workers whose skills are highly demanded by the economy. Thus, the group of upper
tertiary level graduates is likely to be a much more heterogeneous group in terms
of jobs occupied and this could explain that they face a higher earnings dispersion,
even though they have on average the highest earnings premium (see section 6.1).
Let us now examine gender differences in unexplained earnings dispersion and
in the impact of education on it. First, the estimation results reported in table 4
show that anything else equal, women face a higher earnings dispersion, judging
from the positive and significant effect found for the female dummy in the scedastic
function of the earnings equation. Not only do women earn lower earnings on aver-
age, these earnings are also less easily predictable. This overall dispersion-enhancing
effect of being a women is stronger in Germany than in France. Moreover, in both
countries, the level of educational attainment has a different impact on unexplained
earnings dispersion for men and for women. As figure 7 and figure 8 show, the gen-
der differences in the earnings dispersion effect of education are substantial in both
countries.
In Germany and France alike, the completion of a vocational degree (up to level
31) reduces significantly the unexplained earnings dispersion for women compared
to their counterparts with no vocational degree, whereas it is much less so for men,
for which the effects observed are very small in scope. This dispersion-reducing effect
is much stronger for German than for French women.
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Figure 7: Earnings dispersion effect of education by gender (Ref.: Level 10 or 11) -
Germany
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Figure 8: Earnings dispersion effect of education by gender (Ref.: Level 10 or 11) -
France
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From the general maturity certificate (level 32) onwards, the pattern of earnings
dispersion effects changes. For German women, the residual earnings dispersion is
still lower than for the reference group of poorly educated women, but only slightly.
The higher the educational level attained beside the general maturity certificate,
the smaller the earnings dispersion effect. For men, in contrast, the effects go in the
opposite direction. Qualifications above the vocational maturity level (level 31) in
Germany and above the general maturity level in France (level 32) are associated
with a higher earnings dispersion. Interestingly, in both countries, the unexplained
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earnings dispersion is particularly high for male holders of the general maturity
certificate and for male university graduates. However, whereas French women also
face a strong dispersion enhancing effect of having completed university degree, like
their male counterparts though not to the same extent, no such effect is observable
in Germany.
On the whole, the attainment of a higher level of education does not only yield
a higher earnings premium for women than for men on average, but also lead to a
reduction in their earnings risk, if the latter is measured by the earnings dispersion
unexplained by the other observable characteristics.
7 Conclusion
This study analyses thoroughly the way the qualifications acquired within the French
and the German education systems are rewarded in terms of labour market earnings.
It first adds to the existing literature through the comparison of France and Ger-
many. The observation of the patterns prevailing both within and across countries
enabled to gain new insights on the relationship between education and individual
labour market success. A further contribution of this paper is a methodological in-
novation that makes it possible to assess the impact of educational attainment not
only on the expected level of earnings but also on the earnings risk, measured here
by the unexplained earnings variance. A look at the literature reveals indeed that
even though the link between education and earnings has been extensively analysed
internationally following the development of the human capital theory, there is very
little comparative work on France and Germany in this area. Moreover, there is very
little evidence on the impact of education on earnings dispersion.
First descriptive analyses provide basic descriptive evidence on the correlation be-
tween degrees obtained and the earnings level and variance in France and Germany.
In order to isolate the effects of education on earnings level and dispersion, however,
one has to abstract from other factors that might drive the bivariate relationships
observed. The econometric framework developed here aimed to model the impact of
education on the expected level of earnings as well as on the residual earnings vari-
ance, i.e. the variance of earnings not explained by the explanatory variables, taking
into account the non-random and gender-specific selection into paid employment.
Indeed, there is evidence that France and Germany differs largely concerning the
access to employment, especially for women. To account for gender differences that
have different forms in France and Germany, the estimated correlation between the
selection propensity and the earnings equation has been allowed to differ for men
and women. Moreover, gender differences in the impact of variables on selection and
earnings have been tested in a systematic way. To assess the impact of education on
earnings uncertainty, the assumption of homoscedastic variances has been relaxed.
For both the selection and the earnings equation, the residual variance is assumed to
have a multiplicative form of heteroscedasticity and to vary across education levels
and genders.
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The key findings can be summarised as follows. First, evidence is found that
selectivity effects are at work and differ for men and women. Indeed, there is a
significant correlation between the selection and the earnings equation and it differs
significantly across genders. Though the bias is not important enough in magnitude
to affect much the qualitative interpretation of the results, the estimates of the
average earnings premia and earnings dispersion effects of education are affected by
the selectivity bias. Though broadly speaking, the level of earnings increases - ceteris
paribus - along with educational attainment, anything else constant, the relationship
between education and level of earnings is not monotonous when considering detailed
levels of education. It appears that in both countries the attainment of a minimum
level of general instruction seems to be valued by the employers and cannot be
compensated by the completion of a vocational degree. Thus, it seems advisable to
concentrate the efforts on fostering the achievement of at least an intermediate level
of general instruction.
Second, basic vocational education leads to a higher earnings premium in Ger-
many than in France. This points to the better efficiency of the German system
of vocational education compared to the low-status vocational education in France,
which remains rather theoretical, less connected to the job market, and signals failure
in general education. In Germany, however, there is no additional earnings premium
for attaining qualifications at the maturity level, unlike in France, where the com-
pletion of the Baccalaure´at is rewarded in form of an earnings premium. Finally, the
completion of higher education yields a particularly high earnings premium in both
countries, but particularly in France, though study duration is typically shorter. This
is most probably the effect of the presence of elite institutions in France. Further-
more, in both countries but especially in Germany, women have a lower educational
attainment than men but enjoy a higher earnings premium for education, anything
else equal. The gender gap in the earnings premium for education is much larger in
Germany than in France.
Education is found not only to affect the expected level of earnings, but also
the earnings uncertainty, measured by the residual earnings dispersion, after ob-
served factors have been controlled for. Interestingly, the effects of education on the
unexplained earnings dispersion or earnings risk is found to present some obvious
similarities in France and Germany. In both countries, overall, the completion of
vocational qualifications reduces significantly the unexplained earnings dispersion,
but the effect is particularly strong in Germany. By contrast, more general quali-
fications, like the general maturity certificate, are associated with a comparatively
stronger earnings dispersion. Upper tertiary level graduates are those who face the
highest unexplained earnings dispersion in both countries, particularly in France,
due to a larger heterogeneity in the qualifications considered to be of upper tertiary
level.
Looking at the effect of gender reveals further common patterns. First, women
face overall a higher unexplained earnings dispersion, especially in Germany. More-
over, the effect of education on the residual earnings dispersion appears to differ
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dramatically across genders in both countries. As a matter of facts, the comple-
tion of basic or advanced vocational qualifications turns out to reduce substantially
the unexplained earnings dispersion for women, particularly for German women,
whereas no such effect is observed for men. The attainment of a level of education
beyond the maturity level still reduces the earnings risk of women though not to
the same extent as vocational qualifications of lower level. For men, by contrast,
the attainment of a higher level of education increases the earnings dispersion risk
instead of reducing it like for women. Thus, not only do women, on average, enjoy
a higher earnings premium than men for investing in education, but it also reduces
their earnings risk to a larger extent than for men.
The findings show that only examining the effect of education in terms of earnings
level illustrates only one aspect of the relationship between education and earnings.
The level of education attained is not neutral with respect to earnings dispersion,
even after controlling for gender-specific selection into employment and a large num-
ber of explanatory factors.
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Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (sample of simultaneous estimation)
Germany France
Education level (%) Level 10 or 11 11.01 28.26
Level 12 3.00 7.99
Level 20 31.39 20.71
Level 21 17.02 10.28
Level 30 11.68 1.62
Level 31 4.06 4.11
Level 32 1.78 5.59
Level 33 5.07 0.86
Level 40 4.40 10.59
Level 41 10.60 10.00
Female (%) 52.55 52.20
Age (years) 39.70 39.89
(8.67) (8.43)
Married (%) 76.32 69.33
Number/age of children (%) No children below 18 51.70 43.17
1 child aged 6-17 15.52 16.13
1 child aged 3-5 4.21 4.07
1 child aged 0-2 4.92 4.50
2 children, youngest 6-17 9.08 12.76
2 children, youngest 3-5 4.49 5.15
2 children, youngest 0-2 3.92 4.33
≥3 children, youngest 6-17 2.25 4.22
≥3 children, youngest 3-5 2.24 3.08
≥3 children, youngest 0-2 1.66 2.60
Partner’s education (%) Level 1 14.39 36.48
Level 2 47.94 31.77
Level 3 22.70 12.19
Level 4 14.97 19.55
Partner’s gross monthly income (Euros) 1,356.37 1001.70
(169.21) (304.34)
No info on partner’s income (%) 18.32 27.75
No partner (%) 11.23 17.16
Owner (%) 48.95 59.15
City size (%) <20.000 inhabitants 39.58 45.66
20-100,000 inhabitants 27.98 13.24
≥100,000 inhabitants 32.45 41.10
Current quarter (%) 1st quarter 65.66 98.35
2nd quarter 25.92 1.65
3rd/4th quarter 8.42
to be continued...
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...table 5 continued
Germany France
Year (%) 1991 8.91 9.14
1992 8.69 9.45
1993 8.56 9.97
1994 9.38 10.25
1995 9.81 10.24
1996 9.84 10.24
1997 9.73 10.13
1998 10.70 10.19
1999 10.17 10.18
2000 14.21 10.21
In paid employment (selected, %) 60.06 61.86
Log hourly wage (Euros) 2.71 2.26
(0.45) (0.45)
Tenure (years) 10.46 11.02
(8.83) (9.13)
Firm size (%) <5 employees 6.21 27.84
5-19 employees 13.11 9.85
20-199 employees 25.90 15.52
200-1999 employees 24.43 20.84
≥2000 employees 28.80 20.80
Missing 1.55 5.16
Industry branch (%) Industry 32.67 20.84
Agriculture, energy 2.12 3.51
Construction 4.43 5.21
Trade 12.29 11.56
Banking 8.00 4.84
Transports 5.44 4.73
Private services 2.01 16.71
Public services 30.72 31.90
Missing 2.32 0.71
Type of employment (%) Fixed-term contract 4.16 3.91
Part-time employment 20.00 17.63
Public employment 30.64 34.71
Father’s occupation (%) Farmer 4.18 11.05
Self-employed 6.25 10.60
Senior manager 10.91 7.66
Middle manager 15.87 11.94
Employee 4.54 15.12
Worker 38.23 40.36
Missing 20.02 3.28
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Table 6: Joint tests results for selection equation and overall statistics
Germany France
Null hypothesis χ2 p> χ2 χ2 p> χ2
Tests on gender interactions (mean effects)
Female * Education = 0 103.24 (0.00) 1,073.05 (0.00)
Female * Age = 0 23.35 (0.00) 749.56 (0.00)
Female * Number and age children = 0 115.63 (0.00) 1,466.13 (0.00)
Female * Partner’s education = 0 1.56 (0.67) 44.76 (0.00)
Female * City size = 0 22.89 (0.00) 39.57 (0.00)
Female * Quarter = 0 3.37 (0.18)
Female * Year = 0 7.69 (0.57) 30.51 (0.00)
Tests on specific coefficients (mean effects)
Education = 0 83.50 (0.00) 229.26 (0.00)
Age = 0 63.68 (0.00) 1,813.71 (0.00)
Number and age children = 0 19.48 (0.02) 99.14 (0.00)
Partner’s education = 0 16.46 (0.00) 253.11 (0.00)
City size = 0 21.76 (0.00) 1,020.24 (0.00)
Quarter = 0 78.25 (0.00)
Year = 0 106.19 (0.00) 85.35 (0.00)
Tests on scedastic term (dispersion effects)
Homoscedasticity: all coefficients = 0 265.71 (0.00) 1,162.98 (0.00)
Female * Education = 0 79.24 (0.00) 167.99 (0.00)
Education = 0 107.77 (0.00) 367.09 (0.00)
Validity of exclusion restrictions
R2 test 0.47 0.39
Overall Wald test 15,452.40 (0.00) 2.2e+05 (0.00)
Wald test selection equation 347.31 (0.00) 11,283.92 (0.00)
Observations 38,756 654,686
Numer of individuals 8,041 330,283
Log-likelihood -27,463.72 -540,776.61
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Table 7: Joint tests results for earnings equation
Germany France
Null hypothesis χ2 p> χ2 χ2 p> χ2
Tests on gender interactions (mean effects)
Female * Education = 0 90.06 (0.00) 305.01 (0.00)
Female * Age = 0 11.96 (0.00) 1,321.29 (0.00)
Female * Tenure = 0 7.64 (0.00) 1,544.39 (0.00)
Female * Firm size = 0 32.03 (0.00) 837.62 (0.00)
Female * Industry = 0 131.20 (0.00) 413.46 (0.00)
Female * Father’s occupation = 0 22.05 (0.00) 82.42 (0.00)
Female * Quarter = 0 1.44 (0.49) 2.13 (0.16)
Female * Year = 0 8.12 (0.52) 52.35 (0.00)
Tests on specific coefficients (mean effects)
Education = 0 1,812.73 (0.00) 31,158.54 (0.00)
Age = 0 360.67 (0.00) 8,221.81 (0.00)
Tenure = 0 310.72 (0.00) 6,177.22 (0.00)
Firm size = 0 896.33 (0.00) 1,985.40 (0.00)
Industry = 0 446.89 (0.00) 2,262.03 (0.00)
Father’s occupation = 0 264.22 (0.00) 1,796.23 (0.00)
Quarter = 0 135.59 (0.00)
Year = 0 397.71 (0.00) 884.75 (0.00)
Tests on scedastic term (dispersion effects)
Homoscedasticity: all coefficients = 0 792.76 (0.00) 7,073.68 (0.00)
Female * Education = 0 205.79 (0.00) 584.76 (0.00)
Education = 0 353.20 (0.00) 3,450.18 (0.00)
Wald test earnings equation 13,410.06 (0.00) 1.8e+05 (0.00)
Non-censored observations 23,661 404,976
Number of individuals 4,928 219,420
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Table 8: Average earnings premium for education (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Germany France
Selectivity correction: With Without With Without
Men Level 12 0.13 (0.03) 0.10 (0.02) 0.18 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00)
Level 20 0.05 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00)
Level 21 0.21 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01) 0.17 (0.00) 0.18 (0.00)
Level 30 0.12 (0.01) 0.19 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01)
Level 31 0.17 (0.02) 0.18 (0.02) 0.27 (0.00) 0.29 (0.00)
Level 32 0.06 (0.08) 0.11 (0.05) 0.32 (0.01) 0.34 (0.00)
Level 33 0.13 (0.02) 0.17 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
Level 40 0.43 (0.02) 0.47 (0.01) 0.41 (0.00) 0.43 (0.00)
Level 41 0.51 (0.02) 0.54 (0.01) 0.70 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00)
Women Level 12 0.19 (0.02) 0.23 (0.02) 0.16 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00)
Level 20 0.17 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01) 0.11 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00)
Level 21 0.29 (0.02) 0.31 (0.01) 0.18 (0.00) 0.20 (0.00)
Level 30 0.27 (0.02) 0.30 (0.02) 0.28 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
Level 31 0.24 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02) 0.27 (0.00) 0.30 (0.00)
Level 32 0.37 (0.05) 0.37 (0.05) 0.33 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00)
Level 33 0.36 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.30 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01)
Level 40 0.46 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 0.48 (0.00) 0.52 (0.00)
Level 41 0.59 (0.02) 0.63 (0.02) 0.73 (0.01) 0.76 (0.00)
All Level 12 0.16 (0.02) 0.16 (0.02) 0.17 (0.00) 0.18 (0.002)
Level 20 0.11 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01) 0.10 (0.00) 0.11 (0.001)
Level 21 0.24 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.17 (0.00) 0.19 (0.001)
Level 30 0.21 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.28 (0.00) 0.30 (0.004)
Level 31 0.20 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01) 0.27 (0.00) 0.29 (0.002)
Level 32 0.20 (0.05) 0.23 (0.04) 0.33 (0.00) 0.35 (0.002)
Level 33 0.23 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.32 (0.005)
Level 40 0.45 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.44 (0.00) 0.47 (0.002)
Level 41 0.55 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.72 (0.00) 0.73 (0.002)
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Table 9: Dispersion effect of education on earnings (ref.: Level 10 or 11)
Germany France
Selectivity correction: With Without With Without
Men Level 12 0.13 (0.06) 0.18 (0.12) 0.09 (0.01) 0.13 (0.01)
Level 20 -0.15 (0.06) -0.18 (0.10) -0.07 (0.01) -0.06 (0.01)
Level 21 -0.10 (0.04) -0.14 (0.06) -0.05 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Level 30 -0.02 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06) 0.07 (0.03) 0.11 (0.02)
Level 31 0.32 (0.08) 0.36 (0.07) 0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
Level 32 0.53 (0.16) 0.59 (0.15) 0.34 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02)
Level 33 0.17 (0.09) 0.20 (0.08) 0.11 (0.04) 0.17 (0.04)
Level 40 0.30 (0.08) 0.39 (0.07) 0.08 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Level 41 0.63 (0.07) 0.75 (0.06) 0.60 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01)
Women Level 12 -0.33 (0.07) -0.39 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Level 20 -0.55 (0.05) -0.55 (0.05) -0.14 (0.01) -0.14 (0.01)
Level 21 -0.53 (0.05) -0.55 (0.05) -0.25 (0.01) -0.25 (0.01)
Level 30 -0.65 (0.06) -0.64 (0.06) -0.33 (0.03) -0.33 (0.03)
Level 31 -0.61 (0.08) -0.60 (0.08) -0.26 (0.02) -0.25 (0.02)
Level 32 -0.20 (0.09) 0.21 (0.13) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Level 33 -0.20 (0.07) -0.21 (0.07) -0.20 (0.03) -0.19 (0.03)
Level 40 -0.14 (0.08) -0.13 (0.08) -0.22 (0.01) -0.21 (0.01)
Level 41 -0.09 (0.06) -0.08 (0.06) 0.42 (0.01) 0.44 (0.01)
All Level 12 -0.08 (0.06) -0.12 (0.07) 0.05 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
Level 20 -0.33 (0.04) -0.30 (0.04) -0.10 (0.01) -0.10 (0.01)
Level 21 -0.30 (0.04) -0.28 (0.04) -0.15 (0.01) -0.13 (0.01)
Level 30 -0.31 (0.05) -0.26 (0.04) -0.13 (0.02) -0.10 (0.02)
Level 31 -0.10 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05) -0.12 (0.01) -0.10 (0.01)
Level 32 0.20 (0.09) 0.19 (0.10) 0.18 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01)
Level 33 0.00 (0.07) 0.03 (0.05) -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02)
Level 40 0.10 (0.05) 0.16 (0.05) -0.07 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)
Level 41 0.30 (0.05) 0.37 (0.04) 0.51 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
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